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Rapid advances in automation are enabling transport systems to operate in an
increasingly autonomous manner. From time to time, these systems encounter
operational conditions that fall outside a “competency box” of scenarios and
environments for which the system was designed. Human operators add resilience
because they can see and act outside the automation’s competency box. Advanced
aviation concepts envision fleets of highly automated air vehicles providing ondemand transport for people and goods. We examine one such concept, Urban Air
Moblity (UAM) and explore how humans can best be incorporated to maintain
resilience. A human-autonomy teaming approach is suggested.
Advances in automation are changing many aspects of everyday life, including the way
goods and people are moved from place to place. Remotely-operated trains, robotic warehouse
delivery systems, and “self-driving” cars are showing us what a future transport industry might
look like. The urban air mobility (UAM) concept is such a case. Several companies are
proposing UAM systems in which electric-powered vertical takeoff and landing aircraft
(eVTOL) would routinely transport people and products.
In recent years, some proponents of automation have envisioned future transport systems
that will operate with limited or no oversight from a human operator. Proponents of UAM note
that this final state reduces cost as well as eliminating pilot error, identified as a contributing
factor in many aircraft accidents (e.g., Uber Elevate, 2016). This viewpoint ignores the
possibility that human operators add resilience because they can perceive and act outside the
“competency box” of the automation. We use the term “competency box” to refer to the
scenarios and environments within which the automated system has earned trust that it can
operate safely without the need for human intervention. This is similar to the “competence
envelope” discussed by Hoffman and Hancock (2017) and the system boundaries discussed by
Woods (2015). During the design process, the intended competency box may be expressed
explicitly in terms of performance specifications, but some aspects of the intended competency
box may also remain unstated. As operational experience accumulates, the actual competency
box will sometimes turn out to be smaller than intended, as the system fails to deal with
scenarios and environments, including some anticipated by the designers. In other cases, the
system might fail to deal with scenarios and environments that had not been anticipated. A safety
critical system possesses resilience when it is able to adjust its functioning to maintain safety in
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the face of expected and unexpected conditions (Hollnagel, 2015). We propose that achieving a
resilient UAM system must involve the complementary capabilities of automation and humans
working together.
An automated system’s capabilities can be expanded over time with modifications to
software, sensors, and other components. A characteristic of machine learning is that automated
systems have the potential to expand their capabilities as experience is accumulated. However,
even the most capable automated systems have limits, and it is unclear at what point, if ever, the
competency box becomes large enough to safely eliminate the role of the human operator. The
designers of UAM systems face the challenge of how to make the best use of intelligent
automation, while also leaving room for the resilient performance potential of humans.
The UAM Concept
The FAA UAM Concept of Operations (ConOps; FAA, 2020) covers operations
occurring in dedicated corridors in urban environments. This ConOps envisions an initial stage
of UAM operations in which aircraft operated by an on-board pilot fly within the current air
traffic management (ATM) system. Pilots would exert direct “within the loop” control of the
automated systems, much as they do today. The next stage, referred to as ConOps 1.0, would
involve aircraft flying in UAM corridors that are not under direct control of air traffic controllers
(ATC). ATC would, however, have the authority to open and close these corridors. An on-board
pilot would monitor systems and would have the ability to take control when required or desired,
under a “human-on-the-loop” supervisory control model. The necessity of carrying an on-board
pilot clearly reduces the carrying capacity of the vehicle and would probably make this stage
economically unviable for high tempo operations (Uber Elevate, 2016, p38). With the corridors
in place, the ConOps 1.0 stage is envisioned as one where automation can mature, operational
tempo can increase, and use cases can evolve. The FAA ConOps envisions a mature stage with
remote pilots who “passively monitor” aircraft and are prompted to take action in situations
outside the automation’s competency box (“human-over-the-loop" operations). Below we
discuss how a human-automation teaming approach can aid in defining the competency box of
the automation and help to reveal the extent to which automated systems can safely conduct
flights under the full range of operational and environmental conditions, including gradually
changing conditions and sudden threats.
A Human-Automation Teaming (HAT) Approach
The field of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) has often viewed task decomposition in
terms of assigning some tasks to automation and others to human operators; often with a
background assumption that Machines Are Better At some things while Humans Are Better At
others (MABA-HABA; Fitts 1951). The HAT philosophy is to break down those roles in much
the same way as Crew Resource Management (CRM) sought to break down the strict hierarchy
of mid-twentieth century flight decks (Shively et al., 2018), allowing both “partners” to
contribute to the performance of any given task. The term “teaming” is aspirational; it indicates a
desired objective, but not necessarily the current state of affairs.
In a well-functioning human team, all members of the team share an understanding of the
goal. In contrast, we expect that for the foreseeable future, in human-automation teams, only the
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human will understand the context of the high-level goals. Nevertheless, current automation can
work jointly on tasks with human operators, each monitoring the other’s performance and
negotiating task assignments, resulting in more efficient and resilient performance than if either
were to perform the task alone. Shively et al. (2017) proposed three tenets of Human Automation
Teaming (HAT): Bi-Directional Communication, Transparency, and Dynamic Delegation (which
they call Operator Directed Interface). The first two of these tenets serve to enable joint task
performance, while the third serves to maintain the operator’s situation awareness and ensure
that the automation is assigned tasks within its competency box.
Bi-directional Communication
Bi-directional communication is central to the concept of HAT. For there to be joint task
performance, the automation and the human operator must be able to share information, goals,
and strategy. As noted above, the automation does not have the same deep understanding of the
system goals that the operator does (e.g., why are we going to Gilroy?); however, it can have
information about what is necessary to achieve the goals (strategy) and the states that it must
achieve on the way (sub-goals). It can display this information, along with reasons one strategy
is preferable to another, give feedback on operator proposed strategies, and take into account
information that the operator has that it may not be able to independently sense. Perhaps most
importantly, the automation must be able to inform the human when it has encountered
conditions that fall outside (or may be approaching) the limits of its competency box. Such a
“call for help” from the automation triggers a non-normal state for the human operator.
Transparency
In some cases, we delegate a function to automation (e.g., an electronic engine controller)
and leave the machine to perform its function, only informing the human if the system fails.
However, if we expect humans and automation to work interactively, the human needs to be able
to perceive what the automation is doing, and why the automation is doing it. With this
understanding, the operator can judge if the automation is missing information or insight, or,
conversely, whether the automation has information that the operator was unaware of. While this
may seem obvious, automation is not always particularly transparent to the human operator. This
lack of transparency can be the result of interface design choices, but it can also be the result of
machine learning algorithms that obscure the cues used by the automation in making decisions.
Dynamic Delegation
In contrast to a static division of tasks between the human and automation, dynamic
delegation involves a more flexible allocation of work, taking into account factors such as
workload and time pressure. While, traditionally, automation operates with a particular level of
human oversight (e.g., Sheridan & Verplank, 1978), a feature of dynamic delegation is that
working agreements (Gutzwiller et al., 2017) allow the level of human oversight to vary
according to the conditions. In particular, automation can be restricted to acting autonomously
only under conditions that are clearly within its competency box. For example, automation might
be trusted to land an aircraft autonomously on an unoccupied landing pad but require operator
verification before landing on a pad with concurrent operations. Importantly, as automation earns
increasing trust, the range of conditions within the competency box increase and the need for
136

operator oversight decreases. Shively et al. (2017) propose that dynamic delegation can also
involve predetermined sets of actions that are grouped together so that they can be quickly
implemented, referred to as “plays.” In aviation they act much like a checklist or quick reference
handbook, in that they define the tasks needed for a particular situation; however, they also
contain working agreements governing the level of automation expected for each task.
Applying HAT to UAM
The success of a mature UAM system will depend on its ability to demonstrate resilience
in the face of anticipated and unanticipated conditions. We maintain that when highly automated
systems operate in complex environments, human operators contribute to system resilience via
their ability to see and act outside the competency box of the automation. HAT principles can
help humans perform this role. The FAA UAM ConOps outlines several functions and roles
where human operators’ ability to see and act outside the competency box of the automation,
may protect the system while allowing automation to earn trust where appropriate.
Pilot in Command (PIC)
The PIC is the only role called out by the FAA’s UAM ConOps that is clearly assigned to
a human. The Code of Federal Regulations states that “the pilot in command of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft” (14 CFR
91.3a). The evolution of UAM envisioned by the ConOps is largely the evolution of this position
from an onboard pilot who is in the loop on flying the aircraft, in much the same way as
helicopter pilots are today, to a remote pilot, operating “over the loop” (HOVTL), managing
contingencies for multiple aircraft. While the responsibility of the remote pilot remains
unchanged, their ability to exert authority when operating HOVTL relies on appropriate bidirectional communication between human and automation. Ideally, an automated system would
have the capability to alert the pilot when it is about to encounter a condition that falls outside its
competency box. Transparent automation enables the human operator to understand how the
automation will respond. In contingency conditions, dynamic delegation can ensure that
responses are assigned to the entity most able to appropriately respond in the time available. In
order to achieve HOVTL operations, further increases in automation will be necessary with most
routine operations becoming fully automated. That automation will need to be trusted, and that
trust will need to be earned. The HAT paradigm discussed above gives us an incremental path
for verifying this automation in an operational environment.
Air Traffic Control (ATC)
The FAA ConOps envisions a significant change in the role of ATC between the initial
operations stage, which, similar to current helicopter route operations, require the PIC to interact
with ATC, and the ConOps 1.0 stage, where UAM vehicles operate within corridors with
minimal ATC interaction. The FAA ConOps specifies that ATC will “respond to UAM offnominal operations as needed” (FAA, 2020). This is a potentially difficult task (particularly if
there were to be any large-scale system failure) and it is to be added to ATC’s normal workload
managing aircraft. Controllers could be aided in performing this task through appropriate system
transparency that allows them to gain situation awareness as rapidly as possible, and a play
structure that allows them to quickly organize and delegate the tasks necessary to mitigate
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contingencies safely. Further, ConOps 1.0 could be implemented in an incremental way by the
gradual delegation of tasks from ATC to automation. For example, corridors could start off as
default flight paths, and assignment of aircraft to corridors could initially be manual with
automated recommendations or mixed initiative depending on working agreements. This
incremental development would serve several purposes: Testing the automation while controllers
are still in (or at least on) the loop, developing and calibrating trust in the automation, and
creating a hierarchy of plays that operators can fall back on under off-nominal conditions.
Operator
UAM operators are commercial entities that are responsible for regulatory compliance
and all aspects of UAM operation execution. Prior to a flight, the UAM operator obtains
information such as weather conditions and aerodrome availability, plans the flight, and provides
the information necessary to operate in a UAM corridor. It is envisioned that for larger “airline”
operations, the operator would also perform a role coordinating individual aircraft operations,
akin to modern day dispatch. Setting the high-level goals and policy are intrinsically human
roles; however, these roles are increasingly informed by automated interactive computer
modeling. The dispatch-like roles are likely to be highly automated, even in initial operations,
however, these roles will involve mitigating contingencies, and thus tasks that are likely to be at
or beyond the borders of the automation’s competency box. To maintain safety and efficiency we
expect human operators will typically delegate dispatch-like tasks to automation; although under
dynamic delegation, a human will need to be more closely involved in these operations at times.
Provider of Services for UAM (PSU) & UAS Service Supplier (USS)
As defined in the FAA UAM ConOps, PSUs and USSs are the information integration
and dissemination backbone envisioned for UAM. They collect intent information for aircraft,
availability information for air corridors and landing sites, weather information, and other
operationally relevant information, provide this information to operators and assist with
scheduling flights. PSUs and USSs may be automated, although this is not specified in the
FAA’s ConOps. Presumably someone will have to manage PSUs in off-nominal situations.
Building PSUs and USSs to be transparent and creating plays that allow human operators to take
control without handling all network traffic would seem to improve system resilience.
Aerodrome Managers
The FAA UAM ConOps specifies that UAM aircraft takeoff and land at “aerodromes”;
although others refer to these as “vertiports.” While the ConOps does not specify human
interaction at these aerodromes, some human interface is likely required, as aerodrome
operations will periodically present conditions that fall outside the competency box of automated
systems. Loading and unloading aircraft is somewhat unpredictable, which, in turn, adds
unpredictability to the availability of the aerodrome. Unlike buses or subways where a car can
simply wait when arriving at an occupied station, battery capacity on UAM aircraft is unlikely to
allow for extended hovering. Dynamic delegation will be critical, as aerodrome managers will
likely be required to recognize the state of the aerodrome, assist in smoothing traffic flow, and
interface with the PIC and PSU about availability windows.
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Conclusion
As progress towards a future UAM system continues, designers must not overlook the
positive contribution made by human operators to system resilience. A challenge facing
designers of UAM systems is to integrate the characteristics of humans and automation to
produce an effective human-automation team. Rather than assigning tasks in a static manner to
either automated systems or humans, future UAM systems are likely to involve a flexible
approach to task delegation. This will require operational personnel to possess an appropriate
awareness of the functioning of automation and be equipped to monitor performance, anticipate
conditions that will fall outside the automation’s competency box, and respond as necessary. A
HAT framework may be useful in achieving a resilient UAM system that involves the
complementary capabilities of automation and humans working together.
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